Several conclusions must be drawn from our talk after dinner:

1. We are, in the Far East, grievously short of aircraft. Three squadrons of fighters, even Gladiators, would have a great deterrent effect upon Japan.

2. The army problem is principally one of material, though a turned-over Australian Brigade Group would be “most helpful”.

3. The absence of naval craft must encourage the Japanese.

4. If Japan is to take over Thailand and moves down the Malay Peninsula, we should push forward to a point already selected, even if it does mean a breach of neutrality.

5. This Far Eastern problem must be taken seriously and urgently. (I at once sent instructions to Australia that three-cornered staff talks should occur at Singapore at once, so that results may be cabled to us in London).

6. Brooke-Popham ² is I gather active and a disciplinarian. He must ginger up these other people, who have a more garrison outlook. Why the devil these generals and people should be ignorant of and not interested in the broad principles of international strategy I cannot understand. All the talk on those aspects was by myself, with Shedden feeding me with material.

7. We must as soon as possible tell Japan “where she gets off”. Appeasement is no good. The peg must be driven in somewhere. I must make a great effort in London to clarify this position. Why cannot one squadron of fighters be sent out from N. Africa? Why cannot some positive commitment be entered into regarding naval reinforcement of Singapore? At this stage, misty generalisations will please and sustain the Japanese, and nobody else.

We must as soon as possible tell Japan “where she gets off”. Appeasement is no good. The peg must be driven in somewhere.

Curious interview with British & Australian press. Some noodle thinks my speech ³ about the Pacific was “appeasement”.

What a perversion. What a tyranny over inferior minds words and phrases exercise! I must be careful not to say “Good day” to my neighbour. Our true policy vis á vis Japan is firmness & friendliness: the two are not inconsistent.

Curious interview with British & Australian press. Some noodle thinks my speech about the Pacific was appeasement.

To the Admiralty, where A. V. Alexander ⁴ certainly impresses as knowing his Department thoroughly. I emphasise the uselessness of rhetorical phrases such as “cutting our losses in the Mediterranean and proceeding to your assistance”. A. V. agrees. They are to give me a realistic statement of—

(a) What ships can come East in the near future

(b) What ships could come East if war with Japan broke out.

The real truth, which we are all beginning to see, is that air reinforcement to Singapore and the Far East is the great deterrent (apart from USA) to Japan. The Jap is reported here a bad airman. Even on the naval side, the Second Sea Lord (Phillips) said British fleet would be happy to attack with only 60% of the Japanese force! The Japanese experience in China seems to point to a similar state of affairs in the Army!

The real truth...is that air reinforcement to Singapore and the Far East is the great deterrent (apart from USA) to Japan.

Roosevelt was in bed recovering from a touch of gastritis. He looks older and more tired, but my hour with him, with fair give and take of conversation, was most vigorous. He (and Hull) agreed that we all ought to tell Japan where she gets off, but each of them stops short of actually instructing the USA Ambassador to do so. But, I am left in no doubt (without words) that America will not stand by & see Australia attacked. I plead for reality about N.E.I. 4 and Singapore.

Don’t think Pacific will be denuded of USA naval forces.